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Introduction 
The combination of the words 'chain' and 'management' suggests an optimism in the 
possibility to influence and control a flow of goods or services in a way that preset targets 
are met. 'Chain' stands for the system of stages that are linked through the process that 
aims at narrowing the gap between primary extraction and final use. 'Management' 
denotes the possibility to coordinate the processes that exist between these stages. 
'Control' can be accomplished in different ways. From a governmental point of view, 
control can be accomplished through legal prespcriptions, that have to comply with 
rulemaking of the European Union (somewhat old-fashioned depicted as EC). Govern-
mental control is not solely accomplished through limiting prescriptions but can be reali-
sed by incentives too. Incentives or directives can focus: 
the chain and the different stages in the process especially when subsidies or quality 
assurément aim at maintaining a flow of goods that is essential for the functioning of 
society; 
can pin-point the beginning of the chain, for instance as takes place in product-lia-
bility; 
can pinpoint the end of the chain, for instance to protect consumers' rights. 
The legal framework limits the possibilities for individual enterprises to cooperate and/or 
to compete. From an economic standpunt of view, cooperation or competition that takes 
place within the legal framework can influence the (transaction) costs of entities within a 
chain. And moreover, between legality and economicality interdependencies exist, law 
can be viewed at 'from the perspective of the economist' (E.J.P. Mackaay, 1988). 
Opportunities and limitations of chain management can be located in: 
the legal framework that provides the space and possibilities in which parties can 
operate; 
economic factors that provide positive or negative impulses for the bargaining pro-
cess itself as is the case when contracting costs exist; 
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legal impulses that have effects on the bargaining process and that can be restated in 
economic criteria, such as liability rules. 
Studying chains is not a one way process. In gathering and analysing chains and presen-
ting information about chains in a coherent and consistent manner, chains are object in a 
double sense. Through the gathering of knowledge about chains and the use of this 
knowledge, a spin-off of scientific findings to the companies that are linked in chains 
could be realized. 
The question can be asked if there are limitations to the management of chains from a 
leagal perspective. If such hurdles exist, attention should be drawn to the limitations of 
chain-management itself, that is, in essence, cooperative action. 
In this paper attention is concentrated on the following key-areas that are of importance 
in studying the possibilities to cooperate and/or to compete: 
national trade barriers and horizontal or vertical agreements between companies to 
reduce competition (par. 2); 
the assessment of quality and product specifications (par. 3); 
the joint effort to solve the environmental problem (par. 4). 
On each of the above areas of possible interference with national and european regula-
tions are considered. In paragraph 4 more than moderate attention is payed to chaining 
problems in the environmental-damage issue, as it is of special concern in future research. 
In par. 5 concluding remarks will focus on consequences for the direction of future re-
search with regard to legal issues in chain-management. 
Realising a european market: getting rid of trade-barriers 
As the major goal of the european unification effort is to reduce limitations for competi-
tion within the European borders, all three named areas are of concern, as measures of in-
dividual states or companies can disturb a 'workable competition'. Rules against unfair 
competition (art. 85 - 90 of the EC-treaty) and against governmental barriers were created 
to enhance such circumstances (L. J. Brinkhorst/R. Barents, 1990 page 107). 
So competition is enhanced by: 
the breaking-off of national trade barriers for the flow of goods over the borders (par. 
2.1); 
a restrictive policy on agreements between individual companies (par. 2.2). 
As the EC has created a autonomous judicial system (Van Gend en Loos, Court of Justice 
case 26-1962), that passes by national legistic efforts, chain management should not con-
flict but only be subsidiary to efforts to achieve a free EC-market (Simmenthal case, Case 
106-1977). 
Trade restrictons 
A common markt encompasses not only the free transfer of goods (art. 30 -37), but also 
the free practice of professions (art. 48/52), of delivering services (art. 59) and of capital 
(art. 67). Import barriers can lie in prices (duties and taxes, art. 12) or quantitative import 
restrictions. The Dassonville-case has shown that any measures that can have the same 
impact as quantitative import restrictions are prohibited (Dassonville case; Court of Jus-
tice Case nr. 8-1974). 
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Intercompany agreements and economic power 
In a competitive market profit margins are under constant pressure and producers are 
forced to innovate to create a temporary advantage. Paradoxally, protection that com-
panies seek through mutual agreements, is motivated by competition itself, since in a per-
fect and liberal market any profit margin will diminish. As long as there is a difference 
between costs and selling-price more companies will join on the market. 
Trade barriers on the other hand have a negative impact on real income of consumers. 
Cooperative action of companies to protect prices and market shares can violate art. 85/86 
of the Treaty, if the agreement possibly has a negative influence on trade between Treaty-
countries, even if the horizontal agreements exist between companies that are located in 
only one EC-country (VCH-case, Court of Justice case nr. 8 - 1972; compare H.W. de 
Jong, 1990). According to art. 85,1 common market objectives can be frustrated if agree-
ments, decisions or coordinated behaviour can diminisch trade between Treaty-countries 
and aim at or result in an obstacle for competition. Such agreements should be reported to 
the Commission that can grant examption from the prohibitions of art. 85. Examption can 
be granted if cooperation aims at technical improvement of products or (economic) pro-
gress. Art. 85,3-b however states that such examption may not result in or aim at eliminat-
ing competition for an important part of total production. 
Article 86 concerns the disuse of economic power, for instance as a consequence of 
take-overs (Case 6-1972, Continental Can). 
Under dutch law, the Ministry of economic affairs should be informed about the agree-
ments on price or market regulations (art. 2 ECA, Economic Competition Act) which can 
be generalized (art. 6 ECA). The measures against agreements on the basis of the dutch 
Economic Competition Act (ECA) can concern (generic) annulation after suspension. 
This measure focuses on the agreement itself (art. 23 ECA) and is primarily a horizontal 
instrument. The publication of information (art. 19/24) however aims at mobilising public 
opinion and is therefore a vertical instrument. The ECA can be used against specific 
clauses in horizontal agreements that frustrate public interest, and can for the same reason 
be used against economic dominance in a market (art. 24 ECA). 
As dutch law concerns only those regulations on competition and economic power posi-
tions that have negative consequences for public interest (particularly when a situation 
occurs that can be characterized as unfair competition), it is possible that dutch policy vi-
olates EC-regulations that are based on the principle of prohibitive regulation. It should 
be noted too, that under dutch law there should be a formal agreement between companies 
before government interference is applicable, while on the European level even coordina-
ted action between organisations can lead to measures from the European Commission on 
the basis of EEC's provision nr. 17 (RUG, 1992, page 87). 
Cooperation in the chain 
Horizontal agreements between companies operating in the same branche can have verti-
cal implications. This is of importance: for understanding transactions between com-
panies vertically in a chain, apparently agreements on cooperation horizontally matter. 
Market structure can stimulate the realisation of horizontal agreements in a vertical-up-
ward direction. Referring to the pork meat-chain, constant pressure on transfer-prices for 
pork between retail trade and delivering companies cannot be met by quality improve-
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ment alone, since such quality improvement will only lead to lower prices (for the con-
sumer) or larger profit margins (for the super market chains). The constant pressure on 
prices, that is a consequence of oligopolistic tendencies in the retail-sector, and strong 
competition in stages upward the chain, leads to the shifting of pressure on margins up-
ward, to the farmers, with possibly fatal consequences for Dutch companies in the near 
future. As downward the chain loss of margin on meat is compensated through gains on 
other products (companies have a highly diversified composition of products to offer) and 
the acquisition of products by customers takes place through 'package-deals' with retai-
lers, specialisation upward the chain becomes a death-trap for which quality improve-
ment givens no definitive solution. 
Another 'inequality of arms' should be noted. Retailers have a freedom of choice be-
tween the delivering companies, but the same freedom of choice is not applicable up-
wards the chain because of cost- and capacity- and storage-structure. Cost-structure is 
important because realised long-term investments create inflexiblity in production; ca-
pacity-structure is important because the existing over-capacity aggrevates pressure on 
margins; ans storage-costs are important because the loss of clients is immediately trans-
lated in cost of capital that lies fallow. 
Quality improvement has (as stated) only a positive aspect for the short run since it 
opens up markets abroad, it compensates in a sence the natural disadvantage that exists in 
the distance to the consumer abroad, and creates a temporary margin at home in a compe-
titive market. At the home-market it helps to keep up with companies in the same bran-
che. Of course quality improvement itself is a welcome result of competition, but for the 
companies involved it is only profitable if profit margins can be restored. 
It may therefore be of importance for survival of companies in the dutch agri meat-sec-
tor to come to joint calculation schemes on product prices in relation to quality, but joint 
action violates the aim of disclosure of markets and is therefore of special interest for eu-
ropean monitoring agencies too. 
Whereas european policy aims at enhancing competition, dutch law and practice are 
permissive despite recent measures of the Department of Economic Affairs to prohibit 
agreements on vertical price regulations (and perhaps necessarily is in the light of policy 
in other counties). 
Quality improvement 
Quality prescriptions can have a positive and a negative impact on competition. From a 
Hayekian point of view, as Hayek promotes a liberal economy that is totally different 
from the Netherlands' guided economy, economic policy should concern mainly the pro-
hibition of cartels and the setting of qualitative non-discriminating requirements for new 
busineses and for products (B. Hessel, 1992, page 5). Since national quality prescriptions 
can conflict EC's primary objective, quality assessment from a european perspective aims 
at protection of end-users (Rau case 261-1981) and by the object of eliminating unfair 
competition. 
Prescriptions on product quality and composition that are officially motivated by health 
protection on art. 36 (Sandoz case 174-1982) can come in violation with with art. 30 of 
the Treaty, if the measure has similar effects as a quantitative import restriction. From the 
Cassis de Dijon-case it follows that national rules to protect consumers' safety and health 
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are not applicable if this protection is garantueed by the rules of the state of origin (L.J. 
Brinkhorst/R. Barents page 109). 
For integral chain management it means that quality regulations downward a chain are 
prohibited if such regulations aim at frustrating EC-policy to open markets. 
Environmental care 
From a european point of view, environmental care is of special interest. On a global level 
no legal authority exists that can force national governments to diminish environmental 
pollution. On a mondial level the enhancement of environmental care can only be stimu-
lated indirectly through the expression of recommandations. The formulation of rules by 
individual governments must be seen in relation with and subordinated to EC-rule making 
(L.J. Brinkhorst/R. Barents, page 210). 
Art. 130,4 states that measures are taken on a european level only if through communo-
tory better results an be realized than on a national level. Art. 130t leaves open the 
possibility for national environmental rulemaking to be more severe than EC-measures. 
According to art. 130t these measures must fit in the context of the Treaty. 
From the primary objective of the EC as an economic community, the possibilities to 
alleviate rulemaking and rule-enforcement on a national level can therefore diminish. For 
instance the possibilities to cut down the number of enterprises that have to ask for spe-
cial permission if enterpreneural operations create environmental risks under the 'Wet 
Milieubeheer' (General Environmental LAW, GEL), by the formulation of general rules 
as is possible under dutch law (art. 8.40 GEL), are narrowed by the EC-directive on 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (J. Verschuuren page 107 -108). 
In dutch law there are three sources for legal restraints on the creation of environmental 
pollution. Apart from public law, that is based on specialisation in environmental sectors 
(air, water, soil, sound) and are linked to the GEL (with exception of the Water Pollution 
Act), environmental pollution and the behaviour that causes environmental damage, is 
opposed by criminal and civil law. In the following, attention will be focused on civil law, 
as tort law (especially art. 6:162 of the dutch Civil Code) is less vulnerable for conflict 
with efforts on the european stage than public law. 
Civil law can take two extreme positions as to the question who exactly has to bear the 
loss that occurs on an incident with environmental damage. With the absence of any civil 
rules that hold the polluter responsible for environmental damage, its the pollutee that has 
to bear the loss. This does not necessarily mean that damage will not form part of the pri-
vate costs of a firm, since victims might be willing to pay for preservation of their health 
and property. At the other extreme, under a system of strict liability, it will be the polluter 
that bears the financial consequences. This does not necessarily mean that the victim's 
role is a passive one, since through contracting and negotiations, polluters can come to an 
agreement on the costs of the damage caused. 
Civil law therefore influences behaviour in a situation of strict liability, although ex 
post compensation is its primary objective. This is because compensation itself has an ex 
post and an ex ante aspect. From an ex post standpoint, compensation refers to the righ-
teousness of the recouperation of any loss. The financial loss should be the burden of the 
actor that, in an enterpreneural setting, aimed at a profit in acting as he did. Ex ante it can 
bring about cost minimization and prevention efforts. 
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In dutch law, similar as in the american law system, there is a tendency towards strict 
liability when creating a risk for the property or health of others. Strict liability rules do 
not necessarily have to be effective from a society's point of view in reducing social 
costs, as will be argued further. The (effectiveness of a) liability rule is of importance 
since it has an impact on vertical chain-transactions. Before studying the influence of 
such rules, in the following subsection companies' behavour is looked at. 
Private effectiveness and environmental care 
From a company's perspective, the development of a corporal environmental care system 
is one out of several strategies that can be adopted to meet environmental risk (see for in-
stance P.F. Claes/H.JJ.M. Meerman page 110). In cooping with environmental risk, first a 
choice has to be made between between taking action and doing nothing. If a decision has 
been made to act, then a choice is due between risk-reduction and risk-compensation acti-
vities. Risk-reduction can be accomplished by the adjustment of activities, by invest-
ments (e.g. the implementation of a care system in the organsation) or by combination of 
these strategies. Risk compensation is estabilished by insurance or by creating financial 
provisions. 
When meeting environmental risks in an active way, costs will occur. The costs an indi-
vidual company will meet in producing for the market, consist of traditional production 
and marketing costs and will possibly be increased by risk reduction costs. In the follow-
ing we exclude the problem of choosing betweene risk compensation and risk reduction 
assuming that I, the present value of risk reduction costs, equals present value of insur-
ance premiums (P) and the present value of provisions (O). In all three cases a stream of 
cash outflows (Zt) will occur so that: 
E(I) = PV [E(Pt)] = PV [E(Ot)] = PV [E(Zt)J 
Risk reduction costs are the costs incurred by reducing environmental risk. If risk is not 
totally reduced, environmental damage may occur. Total costs of a firm may, but are not 
necessarily composed of traditional production costs, risk reduction costs and pollution 
costs. If total costs weigh in total on the firm, decisions have to be made as to what level 
Environmental risk 
n o a c t i o n
 | adjustment of activities 
- risk reduction 
L
 action 
investments 
insurance 
risk compensation 
creating provisions 
Figure I. Risk strategies 
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risk will be reduced. Under the following assumptions the risk reduction level can be as-
sessed positively (compare: R.W. Holzhauer/R.Teijl page 125): 
negative consequences of environmental pollution weigh upon the polluter solely. 
the chance on an incident that incurs pollution costs will be reduced by investments 
that in turn raise production costs; 
total operations of the firm will not be reduced in meeting environmental risk (as is 
the case in a short term situation); 
production takes place under perfect market conditions. There is no information 
problem for the management of the firm. 
the firm's goal in the short run is to reduce the environmental risk to a level on which 
total costs at a given activity level are minimal. 
The following symbols are used: 
Co : the traditional costs of current activities 
Do : environmental damage 
p : change for environmental damage 
T : costs of risk prevention 
As the chance for damage will be reduced by investing more money in prevention 
measures p = f (T). The company's total costs (C) under the specified conditions earlier 
will therefore depend upon D, p(T), T and Co. As Co isn't adapted on the appearance of 
environmental risks (or stated differently, as the activity level is supposed to be a con-
stant), Co will not be a determining factor in assessing the optimal risk reduction level. 
An individual optimum occurs when marginal expected environmental damage equals 
marginal risk prevention costs. 
In a perfect market with the same cost structure for all the companies on that market an 
optimal situation will be brought about. Thos means that total wealth is maximized. 
Under the circumstances in this subsection, a liability rule has not much to offer. 
In the real world however, costs of pollution will primarily weigh upon pollutees be-
cause external effects occur. 
External effects and the market 
In the above example environmental damage is supposed to bring about internal effects, 
that is costs for the individual company, which stimulate to alter behaviour in a more 
profitable direction. If external effects exist, the burden of environmental pollution will 
weigh upon others than the enterpreneur, so that, apart from results of bargaining efforts, 
no stimulus to alter behaviour is brought about. 
An externality is, 'a cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of one or more people im-
pose or confer on a third party or parties without their consent' (R. Cooter and Th. Ulen, 
page 169). Externalities bypass the main instrument to internalise environmental pollu-
tion costs, namely the price mechanism. 
The existence of externalities presuppose the beaconing of organisations to markets. A 
market functions as an instrument for competition. Agreements between actors on mar-
kets mitigate competition and favour organisation. Any volunteery agreement on pollu-
tion prevention and control, on quality or the use of marketing instruments (e.g. price, 
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quantity produced, sold and its quality) reduce free competition between organisations 
and itself bring into existence organisation itself. 
Markets link organisations that are involved in the propulsion of goods and ultimately 
link consumers to producers and polluters under circumstances (in the absence of govern-
ment intervention) to pollutees. The division between markets and organisations is trans-
parent and as O.E. Williamson (1975) argued, a result of economic behaviour itself, in 
particular by weighing of coordination costs and transaction costs, that is the costs of 
information gathering, negotiating costs and contracting costs. 
The problem R.H. Coase aims at, concerns the transformation of external effects into 
private costs. As H. Demsetz (1988, page 14) and many others in concordance with 
Coase's analysis states, when transaction costs and income effects are zero, the initial op-
timal market situation will perpetuate no matter how property rights are distributed. In a 
situation of free negotions between polluters and pollutees, external effects will result in 
private firm's costs to a level that matches the willingness-to-pay . From a society's stand-
point the thus created market situation is optimal in the sence that it minimizes costs. Two 
propositions R.H. Coase makes in his analysis are, first and extremely important, the ab-
sence of transaction costs, and second the absence of influences from welth redistribu-
tion. 
D.W. Bromley (1991, page 74), P. Burrows (1979) and others have, as R. H. Coase (1960) 
had already argued, confirmed that transaction costs do matter. P. Burrows argues that in a 
zero-contracting costs situation, a Kaldor-Hicks optimal situation (Ql) will result from 
negotiations. 
The negotiations that will take place between the parties will result in a redistribution 
of wealth and a shift in the allocation of resources. The shift, however Kaldor-Hicks effi-
cient, is not neutral (compare: H.J. Simon, 1993). For instance, H. Demsetz (1988, page 
59) states, referring to driver liability under perfect market conditions, drivers would 
avoid accidents and would negotiate with pedestrians if risk avoiding behaviour could be 
bought at lower costs. If pedestrians were liable for accidants, they would change their 
behaviour to avoid accidents. 
The shift in wealth distribution in either liability situations is a consequence of the fact 
that under strict liability rules the pollutor pays to the pollutee, while in a non-liability 
situation the income stream flows in just the opposite direction. Under positive transac-
tion costs circumstances the new equilibrium will be different too (figure 2), namely Q2 if 
polluters are held liable and Q3 with polutees' liability. 
It is shown that the distribution of property rights (the ownership of a controllable 
stream of income that is linked with assets according to D.W. Bromley) is of significant 
importance for the results of negotiations. It should be noted that wealth distribution is a 
prominent political issue, and so is therefore the initial distribution of property rights. 
Outcomes of analyses on economic efficiency of liability rules under assumptions of neo-
classical economic theory do not guarantee a fair and just distribution of wealth. Solu-
tions for the environmental problem cannot therefore result from traditional economic 
theory alone. 
Free competition can not only have undesired effects on income and wealth distribu-
tion, but on the environmental problem itself, since in a neoclassical model, an implicit 
assumption is made of a stream of inputs and outputs that can be repeted endlessly. Limi-
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tations of the competitive model are breavely summarized by D.W. Bromley who states 
that the market is an inappropriate instrument (1991, page 20): 
if high transaction costs exist; 
if large and nonmonetary benefits and costs occur; 
in cases of high uncertainty over the future; 
with the threat of potential irreversabilities. 
In looking for a liability rule that is effective from a societal point of view, one should 
bear in mind the disadvatages of neoclassical economic analysis. In environmental care 
often negotiations between victims and offenders are impossible as a consequence of high 
transaction costs. 
Effectiveness in non-negotiation situations 
One can ask if a single liability system exists that succeeds in minimizing social costs in 
non-negotion situations. 
The appropriateness of a specific liablity rule can give information about tendencies to-
wards cooperation on environmental care in chains and, as a by-product, on effectiveness 
of product-liability, which is in essence a vertical chain-problem. The assesment of a lia-
bility rule that is effective in minimizing social costs depents on the specific possibilities 
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to create or imitate market situations (what R.A. Posner (1986) calls: 'mimicking the mar-
ket'; see H.J. Simon (1993) page 31). 
E. Mackaay (1990, page 141 - 147) compares the costs of (environmental) damage (D) 
with the costs of risk prevention of the offender (Co) and the cost of prevention of the vic-
tim (Cv). Mackaay argues that there exists no single liability system that is efficient under 
all possible combinations of D, Co, and Cv. The following analysis is presented (E.J.P. 
Mackaay 1990, adj.): 
D,Co,Cv Liability on negligence Liabiliy on created risk 
D < Co < Cv or 
D < C v < C o 
C o < D < C v 
C o < C v < D 
C v < D < C o 
C v < C o < D 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Damage for victim 
Precaution offender 
Precaution offender 
Precaution victim 
Precaution offender* 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Damage on offender 
Precaution offender 
Precaution offender 
Damage on offender * 
Precaution offender * 
The liability regimes give non-optimal solutions under the specified conditions in cases 5, 
9 and 10. In situation (5) the offender bears all costs (D Co so the offender had to take 
prevention maesures), of which the victim is capable at lower costs. In situation (9) the 
offender is held liable but costs to prevent damage are higher than damage itself. In situ-
ations (9) and (10) the victim is able to prevent damage at lower costs. 
E. Mackaay uses the level of (possible) damage as an indicator for the level of precau-
tion that should have been taken, the problem exists to get information about damage and 
prevention costs, information that is usually not available. 
Criticisms on the above analysis may further focus the supposed independency of vari-
ables. Levels of care and damage are instead interdependent as higher levels of care result 
in the reduction of losses and injuries and the different impact on behaviour as to the risk 
aversion tendency of individuals. 
A more thorough analysis, including some the mentioned factors is given by S. Shavell 
(1979). Attention is focused on he prevention of accidents. Results of Shavell's theoreti-
cal analysis are summarized below. First a unilateral case is egarded, that is a situation in 
which the polluter has the power to influence the level of (environmental) damage. 
UNILATERAL CASE: 
I Accidents between strangers 
Negligence rule 
Strict liability 
II Accidents between sellers/strangers 
Negligence rule 
Strict liability 
III Accidents between sellers and customers 
LEVEL OF CARE 
Efficient 
Efficient 
Efficient 
Efficient 
Ilia customers have complete riskinformation 
Not liable Efficient 
Negligence rule Efficient 
Strict liability Efficient 
LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES 
Too high* 
Efficient 
Too high** 
Efficient 
Efficient 
Efficient*** 
Efficient 
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UNILATERAL CASE: LEVEL OF CARE LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES 
Illb customers misperceive risk 
Not liable 
Negligence rule 
Strict liability 
Not efficient 
Efficient 
Efficient 
Not efficient 
Too high/too low**** 
Efficient 
No stimulance on reducing the activity level 
Costs of accidents are not integrally included in market prices 
Custumers' perceived costs are product costs + expected damage 
Customers' perceived costs are too high, too low; activity level is too low, too high 
** 
The general conclusion can be drawn that in unilateral cases, strict liability is efficient 
under all the named circumstances, wheras negligence is only efficient under (1) perfect 
risk information (2) with direct contact between seller and customer. Chain management 
will primarily be appropriate in cases where sellers and customers both can influence 
risks of accidents. 
BILATERAL CASE: LEVEL OF CARE LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES 
I Accidents between strangers 
Negligence rule Efficient 
Efficient Strict liability with defense of con tributary 
negligence 
II Accidents between sellers/strangers 
Negligence rule Efficient 
Strict liability with 'defence of contributary Efficient 
negligence 
III Accidents between sellers and customers (nondurables) 
Ilia customers have complete riskinformation 
Not liable Efficient 
Negligence rule Efficient 
Strict liability with contributay negligence Efficient 
Illb customers misperceive risk 
Not liable Not efficient 
Negligence rule Efficient 
Strict liability with a defense of contributory Efficient 
negligence 
Too high* 
Too high (victim) 
Too high 
Too high (victim) 
Efficient 
Efficient*** 
Efficient***** 
Not efficient 
Too high/too low**** 
Efficient***** 
No stimulance on reducing the activity level 
Costs of accidents are not integrally included in market prices 
Custumers' perceived costs are product costs + expected damage 
Customers' perceived costs are too high, too low; activity level is too low, too high 
Inefficient if goods are durables; frequency of use is not reduced 
Consequences 
Since there is no liability rule that guarantees optimal results under all circumstances, the 
problem arises to specify such rules under differing conditions. For chain management it 
would be important to analyse effects on behaviour since liablity rules for different kinds 
of external interference (products, hazardous substances etc.) are not the same. 
Let us look at the consequences of the above analysis for cooperation on the environ-
mental issue. For pollution problems that are unilateral (and many problems in fact are) 
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strict liability is possibly efficient on the level-of-care issue and in influencing the level 
of activity. 
In bilateral cases it may not be efficient at all in influencing the level of activity. 
Governmental restrictions on the level of activities however may lead to increased co-
operation in a chain to alleviate pressure on profits. Cooperation and joint quality im-
provement may be induced by the tendency towards strict liability. This tendency is itself 
stimulated by inefficiencies of other liability systems. Cooperation may be stimultated 
too by the joint effort to reduce the level of risk, for instance in realising technical 
improvements. 
In product liability, the producer that brought the product in circulation, is held liable 
under dutch (art. 6:185 - 6:193 of the dutch Civil Code) and EC-rules (dutch law is a re-
sult of the EC-directive on product liability). Risks however may be created by the use of 
products (e.g. faulty storage). In fact this means that a system of strict liability combined 
with contributory negligence may be efficient. 
If customers are strangers to the original producer, activity level may not be efficient. 
This means that by narrowing the gap between consumer and producer, social effective-
ness of product liablity may be increased. Integral chain management, by which the 
information gap between consumer and producer is closed, may have a positive impact on 
judicial effectiveness, and in the long run a positive impact on product improvement. 
Research on chain-management 
As the opportunities for vertical coordinated action can violate the basic principles of the 
EU, one can ask what sense it makes to study chaining activities. Why, in other words, are 
chaining activities of special interest since these activities can diminish competition by 
reducing the possibilities to enter the market by firms from abroad? That is because 
cooperation is possible, even under EC-law, but within boundaries. 
First it should be specified where these boundaries are located, in a more exact manner 
than has been done in this paper. Secondly, research should focus on identifying legistic 
and private measures that are most effective within the boundaries of EC-law. And third, 
scientific research should focus on the specific consequences for individual companies 
within a chain as to strategy, logistics, production and product specifications in connec-
tion with legal constrains on cooperation. In doing so, scientific research on the manage-
ment of chains can focus: 
horizontal research of branches (milkbranche, seedbranche etc.); 
vertical research on the flow of products; 
research on aspects of chains (quality, environment). 
On the above analysis a special preference for one of these approaches can not be stated. 
In analysing vertical effects, information has to be gathered on horizontal agreements 
(par. 2). Research is necessary on the effects of product liability, since the original pro-
ducer is held liable and operations in following chains are of special concern to him (par. 
4.4). In quality-assesment, restrictions on horizontal agreements with regard to basic 
qualities of products and brands influence behaviour vertically upward (par. 3). The 
environmental aspects can be studied by looking at transactions between stages vertically 
and if such transactions cannot occur, the effect of legal prescriptions and liability rules 
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on chain behaviour (par. 4.3). Studying chain management encompasses more than the 
processes that take place in a chain by following the product, since cash flows go the 
other way around (par. 2). 
My conclusion is that studying chain management does not necessarily mean focusing 
on the chain itself. 
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